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The virtues of greed have been widely promoted by some
economists in the 20th century. Allegedly it is Adam Smith who provides
this new dignity to greed (Lerner, 1937, ix). Kenneth Arrow and Frank
Hahn in the General Equikbrium Analysis (1971), for example, implicitly
assume that Adam Smith's self-interest is the greed that promotes
economic efficiency (quoted in Evensky, 1993, 203). Walter Williams
(1999), a devoted follower of Smith, writes in his column that, "Free
markets, private property rights, voluntary exchange, and greed produce
preferable outcomes most times and under most conditions." These
pronouncements have become part of the cultural tableau. The noted
investment banker Ivan Boesky gave a commencement address to
MBAs declaring, "You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself"
(Andrews, 1966)) In a movie loosely based on his story, the character
Gordon Gekko in Wall Street (1987) opines that, "[G]reed is good....
Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through and captures the essence of
the evolutionary spirit." In other words, greed is said to promote
survival in Smith's competitive environment.
Ethical egoism may be flourishing in American culture, but the
association of Adam Smith with these views is simply wrong. Smith
decried selfishness often and at length. The quotes above do relate to
Adam Smith's dictum that in exchange we should appeal not to the
butcher's humanity but rather to his self-love, and never address our
Three months later Boesky pled guilty to insider trading charges and was sent to
serve three years in prison.
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own necessities but only his own advantages (1981, 26-27). But Smith
drew sharp distinctions between greed and selfishness on the one hand
and prudent (and virtuous) self-interest on the other. The confusion
about Smith's view arises in part from the fact that modern economists
put man into the psychological box of homo economicuss—an isolated,
rational, calculating, materialist with no social or moral connections with
other human beings, and no scope for heroism. By contrast, Smith
found man to be a fundamentally social animal with at times weak
powers of rationality and a great capacity for heroic action.
Given the problems of asymmetric information that are inherent
in many economic relationships, self-control is needed on the part of
economic actors. Self-control is encouraged within an institutional
setting of competitive markets because economic actors have an
incentive to create good reputations for the long term. Hence
competitive markets support the development of virtuous behaviors
(McCloskey, 1994, 181). Yet Smith's system goes far beyond
enlightened self-interest in explaining the internal controls that humans
develop as they become properly socidli7ed. Smith's moral system is
based on sympathy, and Smith states emphatically that "Sympathy,
however, cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle"
(Smith, 1982, 317).
Accordingly, this paper seeks to clarify Smith's views on the
difference between self-interest and greed. It argues for a subtler, and
richer, understanding of the role of self-interest in the economy—one
that extols virtue and not vice as a more reliable defender of freedom.
To begin this discussion we first examine the "greed is good"
philosophy in its two components: a demand-side view (that lust and
vanity will prop up flagging sales to maintain full employment) and a
supply-side view (that envy and avarice will spur greater work effort).
Both views relate to ideas found in Adam Smith.
The Demand-side View
The notion that one's personal vices (such as selfishness) could
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benefit the broader society by stimulating demand was an idea
promulgated by Bernard de Mandeville in a famous poem, The Fable of
the Bees (1714). Mandeville imagines a macroeconomy composed entirely
of exemplary citizens who are living lives of frugality, simplicity, and
virtue. Such saintliness leads to economic disaster, however, because
aggregate demand collapses. Like a good Keynesian, Mandeville would
stimulate demand by tempting people with vices: "Avarice, prodigality,
luxury, pride, envy, vanity, folly, fickleness, and inconstancy employed
millions / encouraging ingenuity and industry and creating pleasures
and comforts." In Mandeville's poem the beehive is kept economically
employed because "every part was full of vice/Yet the whole mass a
paradise" (Mandeville, 1723).
Adam Smith was familiar with this argument and in his first
book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1982 [1759], 312-313), rejects it,
calling it a "fallacy" and "wholly pernicious." There is no evidence that
Smith ever changed his view on this, since he took Moral Sentiments
through six editions and had ample opportunity to modify its content.
Smith's objection to Mandeville is that the author takes away altogether
the distinction between vice and virtue (1982, 308).
For Adam Smith it is not vice, per se, but misperception, that
causes a demand-side stimulus. The rich landlords of his day are
certainly less than virtuous in Smith's eyes. This vain and insatiable lot
do not know the limits of their own appetites. By misjudging their
capacity for gluttony, the rich over-buy (or cause over-production),
resulting in a surplus which is then distributed to the poor: Because of
this misperception,
"[[he rich] are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same
distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been
made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all
its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing
it, advance the interest of the society..." (Smith,1982).
Jonathan B. Wight	 48
Journal of Private Entetprise, Volume XXI, Fall 2005
Hence, while the poor do not own the assets (land) needed to bring
about full employment, the landlord's inability to judge his own
consumption leads to surplus production, and a consequent
"trickle-down" of spillover benefits for the poor.'
The Supply-side View
The more prevalent supply-side view of the "greed is good"
philosophy derives from Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or
the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity
but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own
necessities but of their advantages (1981 [1776], 26-27).
Self-interest supplies motivation that stimulates productivity. To Smith,
however, people often sadly misunderstand their own self-interest. They
seek power and riches, even though such ambition will generally fail to
make them happy. In reality, Smith says, the imagined view of the life
of the rich turns out to be a deception:
In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, [the poor]
are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much
above them. In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different
ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns
himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which
kings are fighting for (1982, 185).
This is part of that same misperception of economic costs and benefits
2For an interpretation of Smith's different invisible hands, see Grampp (2000).
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that leads landlords to overproduce and people to overwork themselves.
Yet Smith provides a positive spin to this, arguing that "it is well that
nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses
and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind" (1982, 183).
Thus, the misperception that riches will make us happier makes us work
harder, which leads to continual progress (1982, 183-184).
To summarize Smith's line of thinking, man is an imperfect
animal, capable of wildly inaccurate judgments. Yet some of our
imperfections, particularly our misjudging of self-interest in the benefits
from wealth, work to advance society.
Is Greed the Same as Self-interest?
Accepting Smith's notion from The Wealth of Nations that
self-interest (within the proper institutional setting) works to advance
society's interests, can one say that these views support the greed is
good doctrine? For this to be so, greed and self-interest must coincide.
The American Heritage Dictionag of the English Language defines greed as
"An excessive desire to acquire or possess more than what one needs
or deserves, especially with respect to material wealth." The relevant
descriptor is the word "excessive." An undue or disproportionate desire
is a craving. A person under the influence of a craving is out of balance.
Obtaining equilibrium in one's life requires moderation and self control,
according to Smith.
Smith has no difficulty with people seeking material
success—indeed he applauds it. Yet the excessive pursuit of it can lead
one to violate the rights of others or to ignore one's duty to the
community. Smith decries such selfishness and notes that it is difficult
for business leaders to follow the right path because of an undue zeal
for their own narrow interests: "the candidates for fortune too
frequently abandon the paths of virtue; for unhappily, the road which
leads to the one, and that which leads to the other, lie sometimes in very
opposite directions" (1982, 64). Hence, it is virtuous to be boisterously
self-interested, to pursue actively and vigorously one's own success—yet
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this ambition must be encapsulated within a larger moral framework.
The literature on Smith's moral framework is immense. For
aspects of it, see Fleischacker (2004), Wight (2002), Evensky (2001),
Tribe (1999), Brown (1997), Evensky (1993), and Campbell and Skinner
(1981). To Smith, self-interest means carefully considering one's own
advantage and security when making decisions. Greed, by contrast,
means only considering one's narrow advantage in making decisions,
regardless of the needs and rights of others. On many occasions Smith
denounced this approach, writing, 'When the happiness or misery of
others depends in any respect upon our conduct, we dare not, as
self-love might suggest to us, prefer the interest of one to that of many"
(1982,137-138). While Smith acknowledges that humans have an innate
selfishness, he argues that we learn to control this impulse so as to bring
our actions into conformity with our duties to others in society. Smith
wrote The Theog of Moral Sentiments (1759) to explain why humans, who
are born selfish and narrowly focused, also care genuinely about others.
Sociability diminishes the further removed in time and place one is, and
hence caring is virtually non-existent in economic markets that are
purely atomistic. Yet, as will be shown below, social connectivity does
exist in many markets and can lead to important economic
outcomes—especially in the construction of the invisible hand.
This inherent clash between selfishness and sociability is what
gives rise to a conversation in the mind that is the precursor to a moral
conscience, according to Smith. An impartial spectator begins to
adjudicate one's internal conflicts. Using moral imagination, a
well-developed person grows in time to acquire an internal regulator
which places the interests of others squarely on one's radar screen.
Eventually, people who listen to the inner tug of conscience strive for
virtue and meaning beyond themselves—in essence, becoming moral
agents. Instead of narrow prudence, which looks out only for oneself,
Smith argues that we have the opportunity to acquire (through
experience) greater wisdom, which leads to "a proper degree of
self-command" (1982, 216). Self-command happens not simply because
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of a cost-benefit calculation of one's gains and losses, but because of
one's internal desire to do the right thing, born out of one's genuine
moral conscience.
Relevance
The distinction between greed and self-interest matters for three
reasons. First, even if greed could make an individual better off, society
could suffer. A medical researcher who fabricates the experimental
results of a new drug therapy could selfishly achieve some personal
short-run goal (publication, tenure, or wealth). But society is surely
poorer for this as resources are wasted trying to replicate the results and
third parties (patients) may be injured. Second, studies have shown that
selfish attitudes (like other attitudes) are malleable (Frank, 1993; Frank,
1996). Teachers who profess that greed is good may inadvertently create
more free riders and discourage civic behavior among their students.
Third, it is not always the case that greed produces a superior outcome
even for an individual. The now-famous Ultimatum Game has shown
that greedy individuals (those who disregard basic fairness in making
economic distributions) tend to earn less money than others in
negotiations (Thaler, 1988). One likely reason for this is that greed can
arouse feelings of malevolence (Boulding, 1969): some players incur a
cost to themselves merely to punish a greedy player. Adam Smith was
well aware of the negative social fallout from greed. He noted:
"To be anxious, or to be laying a plot either to gain or to save
a single shilling, would degrade the most vulgar tradesman in
the opinion of all his neighbors" (1982, 173).
Accordingly, Smith felt that behavior was rightly constrained by the
social network, enforced via the sympathetic responses of fellow
citizens. This framework affirms the role of fairness and a regard for
justice. Justice means the appropriate moral regard for our dealings with
others, as adjudicated by the impartial spectator, in addition to laws and
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courts.
It is not difficult to imagine other circumstances in which greed
lowers economic returns. As noted earlier, greed implies a type of
self-interest that disregards the rights and interests of others (unless
there is something to be gained by regarding them). The famous
Prisoner's Dilemma illustrates the coordination problems that ensue
without trust. Economic transactions between greedy individuals can
entail higher transactions costs for monitoring and enforcing contracts.
Trust and social capital are thus a form of comparative advantage
(Fukuyama, 1993). Some evolutionary psychologists conclude that
humans are hard-wired for cooperation (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994;
Cosrnides and Tooby, 1997).
These are all ideas found in Adam Smith's writings. Smith notes
that virtue and trust lubricate the wheels of society (1982, 316). He says
people go out of their way to deal with those whom they trust:
Thus, upon equal or nearly equal profits, every wholesale
merchant naturally prefers the home trade to the foreign trade
.... He can know better the character and situation of the persons whom he
mists.... (Smith, 1981, 454).
Smith writes that because of this trust, merchants prefer to invest their
capital domestically, which thereby adds to the national wealth. This
positive externality is what gives rise to Smith's invisible hand of The
Wealth of Nations (Grarnpp, 2000). Trust and shared moral values thus
play an integral part in producing the spill-over benefits of private
markets to the broader society.
The counter argument to this is that selfish individuals,
calculating the economic gains derived from appearing to be
trustworthy, will simply mimic this behavior and capture the benefits
discussed above. Such enlightened selfishness can certainly produce
positive externalities, leading to the quip, "There is honor among
thieves." Yet enlightened selfishness is not at all what Adam Smith had
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in mind when he discussed the role of an impartial spectator acting as
the fulcrum of one's conscience. The mistaken idea that selfishness
always lies behind every action arises from a misinterpretation of
self-interest. Smith observes: "That whole account of human nature,
however, which deduces all sentiments and affections from self-love,
which has made so much noise in the world. ..seems to me to have
arisen from some confused misapprehension of the system of
sympathy" (1982, 308). Smith's moral system is founded upon authentic
sympathy, and as noted earlier, Smith unequivocally states that
sympathy cannot in any sense be regarded as a selfish principle (1982,
317).
Modern advocates of the "greed is good" approach have been
careful to qualify (either explicitly or implicitly) that they acknowledge
that self-interest is tempered by some self-restraint. Walter Williams
(cited earlier) makes clear that "property rights" are a key requirement
of a good society, and presumably are protected both by force as well
as honored by self-restraint there is no police force large enough to
protect private property if society at large is larcenous, and hence it is
implicit in a good society that people have internalized some moral code
(they shouldn't steal the property of others even if they could get away
with it). Milton Friedman, in arguing that profits are the only social
responsibility of business, carefully noted that businesses must still
adhere to society's laws and the basic tenets of morality in pursuing
riches (1970). Robert Heinlein, who strenuously insists that "selfishness
is the bedrock on which all moral behavior starts" completes this same
sentence by noting that such behavior "can be immoral only when it
conflicts with a higher moral imperative" (2004). Hence, he explicitly
acknowledges that a higher moral imperative exists, and sometimes
must be operative.
However, there seems to be an internal contradiction in these
approaches. If greedy individuals are voluntarily submitting to the rule
of law, adhering to basic tenets of morality, and sometimes following a
higher moral imperative, then such individuals are not being greedy at
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all. They may be self-interested and materialistic, but their pursuits are
not excessive in the wider moral context. By contrast, a greedy person
would always consider only his or her own interest, and have no other
higher interest than himself or herself on which to base their actions. A
greedy person would calculate whether it makes sense to obey laws and
morality in a given case, and would obey only if it suits his or her
interests.
Conclusion
The thesis of this paper is that the "greed is good" maxim, often
used in teaching about private enterprise, is a concept in need of
reconsideration. It neither represents Adam Smith's views nor is it
defensible on purely economic grounds. Keith Tribe summarizes,
saying:
"The Smithian conception of self-interest is not an injunction
to act egoistically and without moral scruple, safe in the
knowledge that by doing so the public good would somehow or
other result: it is embedded within a framework of social
reciprocity that allows for the formation of moral judgment"
(1999, 621).
Greed is the excessive pursuit of self-interest, with disregard for
the rights of others. Swindlers and charlatans operate from this moral
basis. Investors and consumers can and should take personal
responsibility for protecting themselves from the risks of fraud through
due diligence, diversification, and attention to their own economic
affairs. But given the problems of asymmetric information that are
inherent in fiduciary relationships, it is likely that consumers will often
be alerted to swindles only after the barn door has been thrown open.
Laws and regulations rigorously enforced can create negative incentives
to deter such excesses. Yet here the lover of freedom has a quandary.
Relying on government to enforce ever-more intrusive laws and
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regulations is not only expensive and inefficient, but it curtails citizens'
freedom and privacy.
By contrast, Smith champions the concept of voluntary
self-restraint, brought about by a personal commitment to moral
responsibility. Societies that are able to function with a high degree of
trust, brought about by shared moral precepts and the strong
expectation that impulses of greed will be reasonably checked by
self-control, will provide more agreeable conditions for the flourishing
of a free society with a limited government. Accordingly, greed is not
the same as healthy self-interest---not in our modern world, and not in
the world of Adam Smith.
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